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SOME LESSONS ON SPACEPOWER FROM COLIN GRAY
John J. Klein
Where is the theory of space power? Where is the Mahan for the final 
frontier?
COLIN S. GRAY
Colin Gray passed away in February 2020. He was a prolific author, and many 
within academia and at the service war colleges appreciated him as a great strate-
gic theorist. Yet what is lesser known is the profound impact he made on the de-
velopment of spacepower strategic thought.1 Absent robust historical experience 
of conflict in space on which to draw, Gray’s writings led to a better understand-
ing of space strategy. Crucially, Gray explained how spacepower theory should fit 
within the context of the enduring nature of war, the better to inform the future 
development of space-warfare strategy.
Gray published over thirty books on military history and strategic studies, 
along with innumerable articles and monographs. His ideas and concepts are 
lasting in their ability to illuminate the intricacies of politics, war, and strategy. 
While Gray provided an abundance of strategic thought on which national-
security and military practitioners could draw when considering the application 
of spacepower, this essay will discuss three key subjects: Gray’s development of 
spacepower theory, his influence as a teacher and mentor, and insights for today’s 
space professionals and members of the new U.S. Space Force that can be drawn 
from Gray’s writings.
SPACEPOWER THEORY
Early in his career, Gray showed an interest in space and its relation to the theory 
of war. In 1982, when he was beginning a stint supporting the Reagan adminis-
tration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, he 
published American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems 
and Arms Control. It is noteworthy that the fol-
lowing year the Reagan administration would 
consider the potential deployment of the Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star 
Wars.” For Gray, the publication was intended “to 
encourage informed debate of U.S. space policy, 
particularly military space policy.”2 In this rela-
tively short study, he detailed many of his earliest 
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ideas on spacepower and the character of space warfare, and he addressed U.S. 
and Soviet technical space capabilities, offensive and defensive actions in space, 
and the policy implications of the stationing of weapons in orbit. Gray would 
continue to develop further space-strategy concepts and encourage the develop-
ment of spacepower theory through his numerous works. Alongside land, sea, 
air, and cyber power, Gray ensured that the strategic implications of spacepower 
were considered.
Moreover, Gray frequently wrote on nuclear weapons and the imperative 
to defend against their use. In noting the intersection of nuclear weapons and 
spacepower, he considered nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles to be 
space vehicles for most of their flight regime. Even though during the Cold War 
nuclear weapons benefited mutual deterrence between the Soviet Union and 
the United States, these “absolute weapons” were strategically unhelpful in use. 
Consequently, nuclear weapons are inherently and fatally limited as a practical 
war-fighting tool.3 Also, Gray believed that eschewing strategic defenses against 
nuclear weapons was both imprudent and immoral. Gray argued for defenses 
against nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the basis for deterrence-by-
denial strategy and a hedge against deterrence failure. In particular, he viewed 
SDI as a credible defensive approach, potentially rendering Soviet nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete as reliable military instruments.4 Taken 
as a whole, Gray’s views over the decades directly influenced both U.S. declara-
tory and action policies regarding missile defense and the eventual Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty withdrawal.
One of Gray’s best-known pieces on space strategy is his 1996 article “The 
Influence of Space Power upon History,” written while he was professor of 
politics and director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of 
Hull. In this article he defines spacepower as “the ability to use space while 
denying reliable use to any foe.”5 He also laments that, despite spacepower’s 
growing importance as a domain of warfare, no comprehensive theory of it 
had been formulated and spacepower theorists remained scarce.6 He explores 
the potential reasons for the scarcity of notable spacepower theorists, and the 
epigraph that begins this essay comes from that article. Unbeknownst to Gray 
at the time, the quotation inspired many writers of spacepower theory and 
strategy who followed, including this author. Elaborating on the problem, he 
explained that “[t]oday, space power suffers from an unusual malady—an acute 
shortage of space focused strategic theory and the lack of a binding concept to 
aid understanding of what it is all about. People today, including many military 
professionals, remain less than enlightened on what space power is and does, 
how it works, and how it can and should function synergistically with other 
players in the joint military team.”7
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Gray thought that an in-depth understanding of the theory of war and past 
strategic frameworks could be used to guide the development of a clearly ar-
ticulated, all-encompassing strategy for military operations in and through space. 
Despite a few previous efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of space warfare, 
he observed that no adequate and fully comprehensive theoretical framework of 
spacepower yet had been formulated and much work remained to be done.
Gray had many consistent themes in his writings throughout the decades, 
including his frequent reference to Carl von Clausewitz and the Prussian strate-
gist’s theory of war.8 Clausewitz provided Gray with much of his intellectual am-
munition, and “The Influence of Space Power upon History” is no exception in 
this regard. Clausewitz and Gray both held that the “grammar” and character of 
strategy are in a constant state of change, but its fundamental nature and logic 
are eternal. Drawing from this strategic truth, Gray advised that despite space 
warfare having its own distinct character, spacepower theory needs to fit within 
our understanding of Clausewitz’s writing and the enduring nature of war. Gray 
wrote, “War in space has its own distinctive characteristics that policy must know 
and respect, but that war has meaning only for the purposes of policy.”9 Despite 
being a new domain in which to consider the matter of human conflict, war in 
space—like war in all other domains—will serve the ends of policy in pursuit of 
political objectives.
In his seminal book Modern Strategy, published in 1999, Gray wrote on space-
power’s place within the context of technological innovation and the future of 
warfare. Drawing on the work of geostrategist Halford Mackinder and Gray’s own 
novel thoughts regarding the strategic influence of geopolitics, Gray explored 
spacepower from the perspective of geography, writing as follows: “[W]orks of 
theory explaining spacepower should explore the interconnectedness, indeed 
interdependence, of the different geographical environments. Spacepower is of 
little interest per se. Strategic interest lies in the consequences of its application 
for deterrence and the conduct of war as a whole, within a context lit by steady 
recognition of the authority of the principle that the land matters most.”10
Furthermore, Gray noted that up to that point spacepower theory had been 
approached as almost everything but what it most truly is: the military exploita-
tion of a new geographical medium, and a domain that needs to be understood 
on its own technical, tactical, and operational terms, if it is to produce maximum 
strategic effectiveness. Gray made it clear, however, that the unique geography of 
space does not point the way to some unique logic of strategy, let alone a unique 
irrelevance of strategy.11 Hence, spacepower doctrine still must observe the en-
during nature of war and strategic theory.
Gray also looked to historical experience to offer insights into the application 
of spacepower. Drawing on the long-standing precedents of the application of 
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seapower and airpower, Gray thought that spacepower was likely to play adjunct 
or supporting roles during conflicts. Despite the dearth of strategic experience 
in space and spacepower’s promise to bring comprehensive changes in the form 
and structure of armed conflict, Gray noted that spacepower must not be thought 
of as the panacea for terrestrial security ills. Additionally, he warned that new 
sources of advantage bring new sources of vulnerability—a maxim that seems 
especially prescient for the United States and its rivals today within the space 
domain.12
TEACHER AND MENTOR
Gray had a significant and lasting commitment to his doctoral students, and 
was kind and generous with his time. He routinely held brown-bag lunches and 
strategic seminars at the universities at which he taught. During these gatherings, 
his doctoral students had the opportunity to try out various thesis ideas, debate 
among themselves, and hear any insights or suggestions that Gray had on the 
subject. Gray felt it deeply important to prepare the next generation of strategists 
and strategic thinkers, and it showed whenever he interacted with his students. 
Even when in the midst of writing his latest book or preparing for the next class, 
Gray graciously would carve out time in his schedule to hear about his students’ 
research and offer suggestions. Being his usual self when giving pointed feedback, 
he displayed the gift of using great wit in telling stories and teaching memorable 
lessons.
Let there be no mistake, however; Gray expected the highest levels of schol-
arship from those studying under him. As many of his students can attest, he 
routinely gave extensive feedback on drafts of their doctoral theses. Often, the 
margins of a thesis were full of his comments—in his famous red ink—regard-
ing language use, the need for clarity, and the pitfalls of overstatement. Gray 
consistently taught the lesson of never taking for granted that the reader would 
invest time in your work; one should strive constantly to make one’s research and 
writing the absolute best possible while getting to the “so what?” of the matter.
Ultimately, Gray’s teaching and mentorship likely are responsible for at least 
one generation of spacepower theorists in the United States, as well as around 
the world. He routinely recognized the talents of aspiring authors and helped 
ensure that their works saw the light of day through publication.13 Working 
behind the scenes, he also advanced the careers of others, including advocating 
for those he mentored to fill teaching positions at universities when opportuni-
ties arose. Gray’s generosity and refreshing lack of towering ego were enhanced 
by the fact that he was incredibly well connected, albeit quietly, within the U.S. 
military space community. This lent credibility to his own ideas, as well as those 
of others who studied under him. Through his steadfast efforts and support, 
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Gray developed and promoted a cadre of individuals who collectively advanced 
spacepower strategic thought.
INSIGHTS FOR TODAY’S SPACE PROFESSIONALS
Much has changed since Gray first penned his ideas on spacepower theory. Re-
cently the United States established the newest branch of its armed forces, the U.S. 
Space Force, and published its inaugural space capstone publication, Spacepower: 
Doctrine for Space Forces.14
Because of Gray’s consistent message regarding the enduring nature of war de-
spite the application of new technologies and operational concepts, his writings 
remain timeless in their utility and insights. What follows are some reminders 
derived from Gray’s contributions for today’s space professionals and members of 
the U.S. Space Force, as we consider the reemergence of great-power competition 
and the ever-expanding national-security interests in space.
Space Is Not a Sanctuary
Gray routinely held views that differed from the prevalent thinking of the day. 
Many of his contemporaries viewed space as a sanctuary that should be free of 
conflict. While today the United States and many of its allies recognize space as 
a “warfighting domain,” this is a recent phenomenon; in the early 1980s, it tradi-
tionally was held by most within the U.S. national-security space community that 
space was a sanctuary, or a domain where military conflict would never extend. 
Gray disagreed and stated emphatically in American Military Space Policy, “No 
satellite system, no matter how high its orbit or sophisticated its survival aids, 
enjoys assured survivability. Space is not a sanctuary.”15 Approaching space-
power theory in a way reflecting classical strategy leads to the understanding 
that militarily useful geographies eventually will be exploited and contested.16 He 
observed that many senior U.S. officials of the day incorrectly viewed the surviv-
ability of satellites in geosynchronous orbit as an irrefutable certainty.17
Many of his thoughts regarding the fallacies of the sanctuary school of thought 
and the vulnerability of satellites were reflected in the spacepower writings that 
followed.18 Providing a perspective based on experience and the fundamentals of 
strategy, in his 2005 book Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare Gray observed 
as follows: “It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of 
two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one bel-
ligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the 
importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or 
destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future 
because the use of space in war has become vital.”19
Gray understood the fallacies of viewing space as a sanctuary. Thinking this 
way would result in developed and fielded space systems being vulnerable to 
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attack and of questionable survivability during a conflict extending into space. 
The dogmatic view of space being a sanctuary would lead to the dangerous condi-
tion of peacetime efficiency and convenience preventing serious preparations for 
war. As a practical matter, and on the basis of historical experience, Gray viewed 
the United States as having no realistic choice other than to be prepared to fight 
in space—an enterprise that must involve the development of both offensive and 
defensive capabilities.20
Challenges of Space Arms Control
Gray was a consistent critic of many arms-control approaches used during the 
Cold War, including those related to the space domain.21 In his 1992 book House 
of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, he wrote the following on the paradox of 
arms control: “[T]he first paradox, dignified throughout the remainder of this 
book as ‘the arms control paradox,’ postulates that if arms control is needed in 
a strategic relationship because states in question might go to war, it will be im-
practical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control should prove to be 
available, it will be irrelevant.”22
On the limitations of arms control and its frequent pitfalls, Gray noted that 
many arms-control proponents asserted that the United States needed an arms-
control agreement far more than the Soviet Union did, because of the disparity 
in space dependencies between the two sides. These advocates, however, tended 
to neglect such crucial issues as the scope of activity to be constrained, methods 
of verification, and the Soviet theory of war.23 On the whole, when considering 
the various space arms-control proposals, he viewed them as “pious nonsense,” 
because unduly uncritical obeisance was paid to an arms-control credo that re-
flected a triumph of hope over experience. Cutting to the crux of the problem, 
Gray explained that “[h]istory and the common sense of international politics 
tells us that one cannot legislate against military technologies that states have 
strong incentives to pursue.” In contrast to the arms-control advocates of the 
time, the Soviets understood and used the arms-control process as one of several 
interdependent instruments of conducting international relations effectively and 
limiting the strengths of other countries, including the United States.24
Gray thought that the United States should not sign any arms-control treaty 
formally conceding superiority to the Soviet Union.25 He thought historical 
experience had demonstrated that the Soviet Union had violated arms-control 
agreements when it was administratively convenient, militarily advantageous, 
and economically efficient to do so.26 Without a sound understanding of the 
technological trends that should be encouraged or discouraged, “arms control 
negotiators are engaged in an exercise that is little more than a lottery.” Gray was a 
staunch advocate of the United States maintaining its strategic advantage in space 
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capabilities, and he consistently advised U.S. policy leaders that the United States 
should not seek to obtain, or settle for, equality in space weaponry (whether it be 
equality in deployment or nondeployment of space capabilities).27 He confessed, 
“I am profoundly skeptical of the likely practical value of the arms control pro-
cess to help fashion a military space environment conducive to the best interests 
of the United States.” Gray believed that solutions to the dilemmas of deterring 
conflict must be sought in the realm of politics, “not in weapons technologies or 
in arms-control band-aids.”28
A key takeaway for space professionals is that these inherent problems as-
sociated with arms control likely will reemerge during any future discussions 
on banning military technologies that states have strong incentives to pursue, 
such as direct-ascent, hit-to-kill antisatellite missiles or on-orbit kinetic-kill 
vehicles.
Be Wary of the Next “Big Idea”
Gray noted that there is a long history of the periodic reemergence of technol-
ogy’s application as a “hot” and “new” strategic concept within the U.S. defense 
community. He observed the succession of purportedly novel strategic concepts 
that repeatedly have gained popularity, and then official endorsements, on the 
basis of a largely false promise of superior performance. He warned, “There will 
always be a market for new sounding ideas expressed in jargon and neatly acro-
nymic. They come, they go, and they reappear in slightly different guise in the 
future.”29 Technology zealots’ claims that new strategic concepts will guarantee 
winning of the next war fall within the “zone of snake oil salesmanship.”30
Because space warfare frequently involves advanced technology, and because 
space only recently has come to be considered a domain for conflict, space pro-
fessionals should remain vigilant against those touting the next “big idea.” Con-
sistent through much of his writings, Gray advised current and future strategists 
that there are just three defenses against the usually false—or at least exagger-
ated—strategic promise of the hot, new concept: common sense, experience, and 
a sound education in strategy—especially in the enduring works of Thucydides, 
Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz.31
Predictive Failure Will Occur
Gray also observed a frequent trend—especially within defense policy circles 
and think tanks within Washington, DC—of seeking to predict the future. He 
warned against this predilection and the pervasive use of the phrase “the foresee-
able future.” Gray warned that the future is not knowable in any detail. One of the 
responsibilities of the strategist, Gray advised, is to prevent “the enthronement of 
the kind of official strategic certainty which precludes the development of stra-
tegic and military postural flexibility.”32 Experts and policy makers who advance 
7
Klein: Some Lessons on Spacepower from Colin Gray
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 5 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
a knowable and certain future are dangerous to their organizations, as well to 
those in the fighting forces who will need to carry out their ill-conceived vision.
In contrast, Gray thought that strategists need to acknowledge the reality that 
predictive failure will occur. Strategists must contend with friction, chance, and 
uncertainty, and consequently strategists should be adaptable and flexible over a 
range of plausible—and some implausible—threats, to protect national interests 
wherever they lie. In providing guidance regarding an unknowable future, Gray 
wrote that “strategists have no choice other than to cope with their unavoidable 
ignorance as best they may.”33 Consequently, today’s space professionals and strat-
egists should plan across the gamut of scenarios and potential futures to account 
for the inherent failings of predictive analysis.
Space Is Critical, but Avoid Overstatement
Gray frequently advised that spacepower should fit within a joint war-fighting 
framework and the larger wartime effort. He commented, “Spacepower must 
always be useful, but its precise roles and actual strategic utility will be distinc-
tive to each class and case of conflict.”34 The lesson for competition in space is 
that planning should include conditions in which space-related activities will 
contribute significantly to war’s conclusion, and those situations in which it will 
not. When advocating for the importance of including spacepower and space 
capabilities in joint and coalition warfare, Gray advised, “Space warriors today 
should not compensate for the general underappreciation in the armed services 
by indulging in overstatement.”35 It is paramount that space professionals under-
stand fully the implications of space being a war-fighting domain, while acknowl-
edging the limits of spacepower.
Even though there are no reasons why space operations cannot deliver decisive 
strategic effects to achieve success, the conditions allowing for such a victory 
should be considered rare indeed. This is because for conflict to have the greatest 
impact and affect the strategic level of war, it must affect the preponderance of 
people where they live. Gray wrote, “[A]ll conflict must have terrestrial reference 
because man can live only upon the land.” As a result, there will be practical limits 
to what space operations can achieve strategically, no matter how significant a 
level of command of space is achieved or how well operations are executed. Al-
though command of space may achieve strategic effect, tactical and operational 
space actions will be strategically decisive in determining a war’s outcome only 
on the rarest occasions. This is because strategic effect is decided by the target, 
not by the means of attack.36
Gray viewed spacepower as often augmenting the effectiveness of air, sea, and 
land power.37 In noting how space forces and capabilities should be used during 
conflict, Gray observed, “Military space ventures have been inherently adjunct, 
supportive, and ancillary to the main terrestrial action of modern strategy.”38 
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Each branch of the armed forces has distinctive strengths and limitations, and 
space forces must contribute to this joint endeavor to achieve success in deter-
rence and war. Space warfare necessitates thinking about spacepower from a joint 
perspective and an all-domain approach. Consequently, spacepower and associ-
ated space capabilities should embrace their role within the application of land-, 
maritime-, and air-focused military forces.
Being in a supporting role, however, does not make space forces less impor-
tant. Indeed, winning in the space domain is still critical. Gray commented, “As 
the leading edge of overall U.S. combat potency, space power will decide the 
course and outcome of some conflicts, even though space forces may not them-
selves be combat forces with offensive capabilities.”39
Gray’s ideas and writings inspired many to advance the cause of strategy, includ-
ing that related to the space domain.40 His ability to explain the most complex 
ideas in a simple manner while always answering the “so what?” question was a 
true gift to the development of spacepower theory. He crafted strategic lessons 
for spacepower on the basis of the universal principles of strategy and essential 
unity in all strategic experience.
While many of Gray’s ideas were considered novel and counter to mainstream 
spacepower thinking at the time, his writings and ideas have gained acceptance 
over time. In fact, his “intellectual fingerprints” are all over many of the most 
significant works on spacepower, even including the aforementioned Spacepower: 
Doctrine for Space Forces, which was published in June 2020. Most importantly, 
because his ideas on strategy are based on historical experience within the con-
text of the enduring nature of war, his writings remain timeless in their relevance 
today and will remain so into the future.
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